Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 6

Issue 2

Article 6

1935

Editorials
Leon Green

Recommended Citation
Leon Green, Editorials, 6 J. AIR L. & COM. 201 (1935)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol6/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

EDITORIALS
FLIGHT OF AIRCRAFT-RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE?
In a recent review of the Torts Restatement,' the writer made
,
the following comment pertinent to aeronautics:
A striking example of how confusing inadequate analysis and classification may prove is found in Section 194. There the Restatement treats
2
In"Travel through Air Space" as a trespass to land unless "privileged."
cidentally, throughout the Restatement the doctrinal term "privilege" is made
to bear an excessive load, of which this is but a single instance. In view of
the controversy between the several groups interested in the matter, it would
seem the theory of the Restatement is that by making flight a trespass subject to privilege, the landowner can always insist upon the flyer's showing a
justification as a basis of his privilege. It is seemingly overlooked that this
might be done even were the flight considered a nuisance, or for that matter
merely negligent. But of more importance, any action by the landowner
would, seemingly be restricted to a trespassory basis. Neither of these positions is sustainable. There is every reason to conceive of flight as a right, in
the sense of freedom or liberty, rather than a privilege. Both national
policys and everyday operations throughout the country clearly indicate that
it is a right. The landowner, moreover, is entitled to his action of trespass,
nuisance or negligence as the particular situation may best support, or in
cases of doubt alternatively, as permitted in many jurisdictions. Nor should
the burden of justifying always be placed upon the flyer. As in other cases
the burden may be placed sometimes upon one and sometimes upon the other
party. But in a new situation like this where the law is not yet even made,
much less subject to restatement, the courts should be left free to deal with
the cases as they arise, and in fact the decisions dealing with the problem
have expressly taken this attitude. Any advance restriction such as here
1. Leon Green, "The Torts Restatement," 29 Illinois Law Review 582
(1935).
2. Restatement of the Law of Torts. §194. Travel Through Air Space.
"An entry above the surface of the earth, in the air space in the possession
of another, by a oerson who is traveling in an aircraft, is privileged if the
flight is conducted

"(a) for the purpose of travel through the air space or for any other
legitimate purpose,
(b) in a reasonable manner,
"(c) at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably with the possessor's
enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the air space above It, and
"(d) in conformity with such regulations of the State and federal aeronautical authorities as are in force in the particular State."
This Section is made the basis of an extended exposition by Professor
Thurston in Harvard Legal Essays, p. 501 (1934).
3. Air Commerce Act of 1926. Act of May 20, 1926, c. 344; 44 Stat. 568
U. S. Code (Sup. III), Title 49, Secs. 171-184 ;-as amended by Act of February
28, 1929,
approved
approved
"SEC.

c. 369. 45 Stat. 1404, Public Act No. 418, 73d Congress (S.
June 19, 1934, and Public Act No. 420, 73d Congress (S.
June 19, 1934:

3526),
3646),

10. Navigable Airspace. As used in this Act, the term 'navigable airspace' means airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed
by the Secretary of Commerce under Section 3. and such navigable airspace
shall be subject to a pVublic right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation in conformity with the requirements of this Act."
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attempted is not only beyond the province of a restatement, it is also poor
policy. An attempt to restrict activities of such present magnitude, to say
nothing of their expanding proportions, to anything less than the fullest
recognition government can give them, can only be accounted for by a failure
to recognize their importance to government and citizens alike.
By way of elaboration of the foregoing comment, it must be
granted that in the clash of interests between the owner of land
and the aviator, there is a conflict between two fundamental rights
or freedoms. (Freedom is the more accurate term, though right
is generally used to express the idea.) The landowner has a maximum of freedom in the uses and enjoyment of his land, for government affords him a maximum of protection in this regard.
Likewise, a person has a maximum of freedom with regard to his
interests of personality-one of the most important of which is that
of being active. Activity implies movement of his person and
things. Here, in the exercise of this fundamental right or freedom of activity, there may be many conflicts with the rights of
other persons, and particularly those of the landowner. It is government's job to adjust these conflicts in some acceptable manner.
That means that there can be no such thing as an absolute right.
All rights are relative; that is, subject to the rights of others.
This is as true of the landowner as it is of anyone else.
In the case of flight., the landowner's interest is subjected to
the peril or hazard of physical harm, not to the peril or hazard of
appropriation. It is true that there might be appropiation by such
long usage as to give the aviator an easement, but this is not the
harm against which the landowner is seeking protection. Thus,
the question is: What protection does government afford the landowner against physical harms, which includes also the threat of
such harms.
Government, through its courts, has developed three doctrinal
formulas for giving protection against physical harms-(1) trespass, (2) nuisance, and (3) negligence. These are basic tort law
doctrines, and are available to a landowner as well as to any other
person whose interest may be subjected to such harms. In ordinary cases involving intrusions upon land at or near the surface,
the landowner -has relied upon trespass. In other cases where there
was no intrusion by tangible physical bodies, but interference with
the landowner's enjoyment of his premises by stenches, noises,'
dust, smoke and other perils, either actual or threatened, arising
from activities upon neighboring premises, the landowner has relied upon nuisance. In some instances where there has been actual
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harm to the landowner by physical impairment of his premises due
to the occasional and unintended conduct of a person outside his
premises, the landowner has relied upon negligence. Upon one or
the other of these doctrinal formulas or some one of their variations the landowner has always been able to secure protection to
his interests where government has deemed him entitled to protection. These doctrines have such networks of variations that they
permit the individualization of any case which can arise, so that its
merits may be reached through the judicial process. There are
numerous instances, however, where the landowner's interests have
been hurt in which he has not been given any protection at all.
The other person's interests were protected instead.
Thus, in the exercise of the right or freedom of flight, when
the landowner is hurt or threatened with hurt, he has available all
of these doctrines. The question will always be which one best
serves his purposes for the particular case. And they are not exclusive. They overlap in the protection they afford. One lawyer
or one court may utilize one, while in a very similar case another
lawyer or court will utilize another. In some instances the landowner will be given protection and in others not, for not all risks
will be placed either upon the aviator or upon the landowner.
Liability will be determined in the particular case when the judicial
process through the use of some one of these doctrines has functioned. Naturally, when the aviator is near the surface the landowner will be preferred; when far above the surface, the aviator.
Only by trial and error based upon every-day experience will the
courts be able to work out acceptable adjustments of the many
hurts between these extremes which may befall the landowner
from flying operations. This is the way the common law does
thiings. Nor would it be wise to attempt to make these adjustments by rigid rules, whether by courts or legislature, unless it be
recognized that such rule provide only temporary standards subject to modification as fast as experience points to better ones.
Viewing the conflicts of interests between landowner and avi-,
ator from this point of view, it is apparent how fruitless is the
effort to solve them through the concept of ownership. In the first
place, ownership is a concept for use in cases where the landowner's interest is being subjected to the hazard or risk of appropriation. That is not involved here. The aviator is not trying to secure an interest in the landowner's property. He merely subjects
such interest to the perils of physical harms. In the second place,

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

the ownership concept is too complex and inevitably leads into those
supplementary concepts of "air space," "air columns," "upper and
lower levels," and other descriptive terminology which, while
doubtless valuable for some purposes, get nowhere in adjusting
conflicts as to physical hurts between these two basic interests of
human beings. We can not possibly define ownership unless we
first know the limits to which government will recognize a landowner's interests as against flights. Then there is no use for the
definition. Moreover, to begin with ownership on the part of the
landowner compels the reduction of the aviator's interest to a
subordinate position wholly out of harmony with the dignity of
the valuable interest of personality involved. The freedom of
flight is entitled to recognition equal to that of freedom of the
uses of land.
The very practical difficulties of proof require that the landowner should be given the benefit of all the doctrinal machinery of
tort law rather than be restricted to the single formula of trespass.
Many examples can be given. One will suffice. Suppose plaintiff's
wife is convalescing from a severe illness, and defendant flies his
plane so near and under such circumstances that the wife is thrown
back into a state of high nervousness from which she never recovers. Plaintiff can not prove that defendant crossed the boundary of his sixty foot lot, therefore he is precluded from invoking
the theory of trespass. The incident was a single one, hence not a
nuisance, but plaintiff may have an action of negligence. In fact,
it might be so extreme a case that the defendant could invoke the
supplementary doctrine of presumption or that of res ipsa loquitur,
and therefore make liability as exacting as under either of the
other two doctrines. Even if defendant could prove the crossing
of the boundary and thereby support the theory of trespass, he
might still have a very difficult question of whether the wife's hurt
could be permitted by way of aggravation of his damages. It
would be easier, perhaps, both for himself and his wife to rely
upon negligence, even though there were a trespass. And suppose
the plaintiff, even under the best circumstances, is called upon to
prove whether a flight was across the imaginary boundary of his
lot; 'or suppose that this burden is placed upon the aviator. If
any regard in most cases should be given to the truth, either party
would be put at a disadvantage which he could not overcome.
Even in cases of large areas, guesses as to heights and location
with reference to the surface are most unreliable.
If there has
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been hurt it should be of no consequence that there had been no
trespass. The doctrinal formula of negligence should be available
for the occasional hurtful flight; the nuisance network of theory
should be available for continued or threatened hurt. On the
other hand, if the landowner's interests are not hurt appreciably,
the aviator should not be subjected to the claim of a technical
trespass. The interests of both parties and the public at large as
well, require fair protection and no more. These doctrines will
afford such protection without making either interest subordinate
to the other. It should be a matter of give and take between
equals.
LEON GREEN.*

BOUTELLE APPOINTED COORDINATOR
The various state aviation officials will be gratified to learn of
the recent appointment of Richard S. Boutelle, of Nashville, Tennessee, as States Coordinator.
For a number of years, the work of the Bureau of Air Commerce and that of the several states has been brought into real
harmony by the friendly attitude of both groups of officials. However, the growth of state activities during recent years has involved a considerable responsibility upon the Federal bureau to
point the way toward uniformity in state legislative programs, and
this new appointment should prove of immeasurable value to both
state and federal governments.
Since September, 1933, Mr. Boutelle has been an aeronautic
development expert. He has been connected with aeronautics since
1917 when he enlisted in the Army Air Service. He received
ground instruction at the University of Texas and, after flight
instruction at various fields, obtained his commission at Carlstrom
Field, Florida. Transferred to McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio, in
July of 1919, Mr. Boutelle was assigned to flight test duty as
observer in the section headed by Major- R. W. Schroeder, now
Chief of the Air Line Inspection Service of the Bureau. Following his army experience, he entered commercial aviation for several years and then served as Director of the Division of Aeronautics for Tennessee from 1931-1933. For two years, Mr. Boutelle served as Regional Vice-President of the National Association
of State Aviation Officials and was elected president of that organization for 1932-1933.
*Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
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No enthusiasm for the new office or officer, however, should
overlook the fact that essentially every state and federal aviation
official is also a coordinator! The state people have reason to be
particularly indebted to Carroll Cone, Rex Martin, John Geisse,
John Wynne, Paul Myers, R. W. Schroeder, Denis Mulligan,
Robert Reining, George Vest, and many others. And the Bureau
can well be indebted to the efforts of Frank McKee, Reed Landis,
Fred Smith, George Logan, John Cooper, Smythe Gambrell, and
Howard Knotts for their untiring efforts to promote a single standard of aircraft and airmen licensing throughout the country. We
assume, therefore, that the possibilities for cooperative effort have
now become so promising that the full-term efforts of one man
are demanded. Our congratulations to Director Vidal and Col.
Cone for creating this new office and appointing an excellent man
to its responsibilities.
RECENT C. I. T. E. J. A. DRAFT CONVENTIONS ON
AERIAL COLLISIONS AND SALVAGE
On March 23, just as this issue was coming from the press,
we received translations made by the State Department of the
recent C. I. T. E. J. A. draft conventions pertaining to Aerial
Collisions and Assistance to, and Salvage of, Aircraft. These preliminary drafts are included in this issue, starting at page 265, and
it is the hope of the members of the American Section that any
comments on these drafts will be sent in to the American Section
in care of Mr. Stephen Latchford, of the Department of State, in
time to be incorporated in the recommendations of the American
Section to the C. I. T. E. J. A. Committee at the next session
in May, 1935.

